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Could Fiscal Policies Overcome a Deep Recession at the Zero Lower Bound? 
 
Abstract 
This paper sets up a New Keynesian model in which the monetary authority implements a zero lower 
bound interest rate policy, and uses it to explore whether the supportive fiscal instruments (including 
expansionary government spending, a payroll tax cut, and a financial assets tax cut) are effective in 
overcoming a deep recession.  The salient feature of this study is that it provides a new dynamic 
viewpoint of regime switching by evaluating each of several supportive fiscal policies in terms of their 
performance in alleviating a deep recession.  Two main findings emerge from the analysis.  First, 
when the monetary authority implements the zero lower bound interest rate policy to dampen the 
negative natural rate shock, the economy will sink into a deep recession with deflation.  Second, to 
overcome the deep recession, of the three supportive fiscal tools (i.e., expansionary government 
spending, a payroll tax cut, and a financial assets tax cut), only expansionary government spending is 
effective in alleviating the deep recession.  More specifically, the implementation of fiscal policy in 
the form of either the payroll tax cut or the financial assets tax cut will only further deepen the recession. 
Keywords: Zero lower bound, New Keynesian model, fiscal stimulus, regime switching 
JEL Classification: E62, E63, H20 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
During the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the monetary and fiscal authority in the U.S. 
implemented various monetary and fiscal measures in an attempt to dampen the adverse 
macroeconomic effects of the crisis.  The monetary policy took the form of lowering the 
interest rate.  However, in spite of the Fed funds rate being lowered to a sufficiently low level 
(between 0-0.25%), this measure was found to be insufficient to pull the economy out of the 
deep recession in the face of such a catastrophic crisis.  Thus, various fiscal policies involving 
expansionary government spending and tax cuts were quickly and repeatedly implemented to 
support the monetary policy during the crisis period.  
When the Fed funds rate had been lowered to close to zero during the financial crisis period, 
various fiscal policies (including expansionary government spending, a payroll tax cut, and a 
financial assets tax cut) were proposed by economists to dampen the adverse effects.  A 
question naturally arose: When the economy experiences a serious adverse shock, are these 
supportive fiscal instruments able to effectively alleviate the negative effect on the economy 
when the monetary authority implements a zero lower bound (henceforth ZLB) interest rate 
policy?  To answer this question, this paper builds up a New Keynesian framework to evaluate 
the performance of each of the proposed supportive fiscal policies from the viewpoint of 
transitional dynamics.  To be more precise, this paper sets up a perfect foresight dynamic 
general equilibrium model that is able to describe the dynamic adjustment of relevant 
macroeconomic variables during the financial crisis period when the monetary authority 
implemented the ZLB interest rate policy.  It is worth mentioning that, to make our analysis 
of the transitional dynamics more clear, this paper will provide not only a complete analytical 
solution but also a simple graphical exposition when we examine whether the supportive fiscal 
policies are effective in overcoming a deep recession.  
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In essence, the time interval of the financial crisis embodies a temporary characteristic 
since it will only last for a specific period.  As a consequence, even though the monetary 
authority implements an interest rate peg policy at the ZLB during the time interval of the 
financial crisis, the forward-looking public fully recognizes that the financial crisis will come 
to an end at a specific date in the future.  At that time, the monetary authority will once again 
implement the original interest rate adjustment rule (the Taylor rule).  With this understanding, 
our analysis involves regime switching between the interest rate peg regime and the interest 
rate adjustment regime. 1   Compared to the existing literature on the financial crisis, the 
dynamic analysis of this paper has the following three distinctive traits.  First, this paper 
provides a complete analytical solution of the dynamic analysis to explain whether each of the 
supportive fiscal instruments is helpful in alleviating the negative impact of the financial crisis.  
Second, this paper develops a simple graphical exposition, and uses it to provide an intuitive 
explanation for the analytical solution.  Third, this paper proposes a new dynamic viewpoint 
of regime switching to evaluate the stabilizing effect of fiscal policies.   
This paper is related to three strands of the existing literature on monetary policy with the 
binding of the ZLB.  Firstly, in their recent articles, Carlstrom et al. (2015) and Cochrane 
(2017) also set up a New Keynesian model in which the economy will sink into a deep recession 
with deflation when the monetary authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy.  
However, their analysis focuses on whether forward guidance regarding the central bank’s 
action is helpful in dampening the recession.  This paper instead discusses which kinds of 
fiscal policies (rather than the forward guidance announcement implemented by the central 
bank) would be able to alleviate the economy’s deep recession when the nominal interest rate 
is constrained at the ZLB. 
Secondly, by building up a Markov switching model, some studies, such as Eggertsson 
(2011) and Woodford (2011), pay special attention to the fiscal multiplier when the monetary 
authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy.  However, these studies do not explore the 
transitional dynamics of policy implementation, and only focus on whether a fiscal stimulus 
would generate a large multiplier at the ZLB constraint.2  This paper instead provides the 
transitional analysis with a graphical illustration and highlights that, if the fiscal authority does 
not adopt any supportive policies and the monetary authority is forced to implement the ZLB 
interest rate policy, the economy will tend to fall into a deep recession throughout the entire 
period in which a temporary negative shock is present.  Moreover, this paper comprehensively 
                                               
1
 For the traditional analysis on regime switching (or regime change), see, e.g., Sargent and Wallace (1981), 
Krugman (1979), Drazen (1985), Obstfeld and Stockman (1985), Agénor and Flood (1992), and Lai and Chang 
(1994). 
2
 In a celebrated article by Eggertsson (2011), the short run is defined as the period in which the economy is 
subject to temporary disturbance, and the long run is defined as the period in which the shock reverts to the 
steady-state value with the probability 1-μ in each period.  Based on the feature of the Markov process, 
Eggertsson (2011) cannot discuss the transition dynamics of policy implementation, and instead focuses attention 
on the kind of fiscal policy that would generate a larger multiplier in association with two points in time (i.e., the 
short run and the long run).  This paper instead highlights the economy’s dynamic adjustment during the whole 
time period in association with the implementation of different kinds of supportive fiscal policies. 
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depicts the transitional dynamics and shows that certain kinds of supportive fiscal policies can 
serve as an effective tool in helping to pull the economy out of a deep recession.   
Thirdly, some recent studies including Eusepi (2010), Davig and Leeper (2011), Werning 
(2012), Schmidt (2016), and Shen and Yang (2018) set up New Keynesian models, and discuss 
how the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies will govern the transitional adjustment of 
relevant macroeconomic variables by resorting to numerical analysis.3  In departing from 
these studies, this paper provides a detailed analytical solution, coupled with a simple 
diagrammatic exposition, to explain whether the fiscal instruments are helpful in alleviating the 
negative impact of the financial crisis when the monetary authority implements the ZLB interest 
rate policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 builds up a standard 
continuous-time New Keynesian model.  Section 3 examines the dynamic properties under 
two distinct regimes, and then shows that, faced with the negative natural rate shock, the 
economy would sink into a deep recession if the government were to implement the ZLB 
interest rate policy without any supportive fiscal policies.  Section 4 discusses whether there 
exist feasible fiscal policies that will enable the economy to escape from the deep recession at 
the ZLB interest rate.   Finally, the main findings of our analysis are presented in Section 5. 
2. The New Keynesian model 
In this section, we first develop is a continuous-time version of a standard New Keynesian 
model, which can be treated as an integration of Eggertsson (2011) and Farhi and Werning 
(2016).4  Similar to Farhi and Werning (2016), the New Keynesian model, summarized by the 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and the IS curve, can be represented by the following 
linearized differential equations:5 
w
t t t g t w tc g         , (1) 
 1 0 0ˆ (1 )a a nt t t t tc i i r        . (2) 
To make the notation more compact, the variable with the subscript “0” refers to its initial 
                                               
3
 It should be noted that Werning (2012) focuses on the normative analysis from the viewpoint of social loss 
minimization (our analysis instead engages in a positive analysis).  More specifically, Werning (2012) shows 
that, under the liquidity trap scenario, a monetary policy without commitment would lead the economy into a 
depression coupled with deflation, while a monetary policy with commitment (i.e., the monetary authority 
commits to implementing the ZLB policy over a period longer than the liquidity trap) could lead the economy 
out of the depression accompanied by deflation.  However, due to the difficulty in determining the optimal ZLB 
lagged period so as to minimize the social loss, Werning (2012) depicts the dynamic path in association with the 
optimal ZLB lagged period by resorting to numerical analysis (see Werning (2012, Fig. 2) for a more detailed 
discussion.  Moreover, among the available supportive fiscal policies, Werning (2012) only deals with 
expansionary government spending. 
4
 To be more precise, the model we develop can be treated as an integration of the Farhi and Werning (2016) 
perfect-foresight model and a variety of fiscal policies proposed by Eggertsson (2011).   
5
 See Appendix A for a detailed mathematical derivation. 
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steady-state value.  In Eqs. (1) and (2), t  is the inflation rate, 0 0( ) /t tc C C Y  is the ratio 
between the deviation of consumption tC  from its steady-state 0C  and the steady-state output 
0Y , 0 0( ) /t tg G G Y   is the ratio between the deviation of government spending tG  from its 
steady-state 0G  and the steady-state output 0Y , ti  is the nominal interest rate set by the 
monetary authority, and ntr  denotes the natural (interest) rate, which is treated as an exogenous 
variable.  In addition, at  denotes financial assets taxes and wt  denotes payroll taxes, at  
and wt  are respectively defined as 0a a at t     and 0w w wt t    , and 0i  is the steady-state 
nominal interest rate.  The coefficients  ,  ,   and   are the inverse of the 
intertemporal consumption substitution elasticity, the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, the 
subjective discount rate, and the probability of resetting prices.  In addition, ˆ / (1 )g    , 
ˆ( )( )        , ( )g       and 0( ) / (1 )ww       , where g  is the ratio 
between the steady-state government spending and the steady-state GDP, i.e., 0 0/g G Y  .  
In addition, the economy’s resource constraint is given by:6 
t t ty c g  . (3) 
3. Transitional dynamics and deep recession 
Based on the New Keynesian model reported in Eqs. (1) and (2), we now turn to examine 
how the economy will react in response to a negative natural rate shock when the monetary 
authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy.7  Similar to Carlstrom et al. (2015), the 
experiment we conduct can be briefly described as follows.  We assume that, prior to the 
presence of the negative natural rate shock, the monetary authority implements the interest rate 
rule.  The implementation of the interest rate rule refers to the monetary authority’s adjustment 
of the nominal interest rate in response to a change in the inflation rate (i.e., 0t ti i    , where 
  is the responsiveness of ti  to t , which is a policy parameter determined by the monetary 
authority).  Then, when the economy faces an anticipated shock so that the natural rate 
experiences a temporary reduction, the monetary authority will be forced to take action to 
implement the ZLB interest rate policy (i.e., *ti i , where *i  is a sufficiently constant low 
and non-negative level of the nominal interest rate).  Finally, when the negative natural rate 
shock vanishes, the monetary authority will once again implement the interest rate rule. 
As described above, the regime switch that we consider involves the interest rate peg 
regime and the interest rate rule regime.  In what follows in this subsection, we will first 
discuss the dynamic system under these two regimes.  Then, we will show that, in the face of 
a negative natural rate shock, the economy will fall into a deep recession when the monetary 
authority implements the zero lower bound (ZLB) interest rate policy. 
                                               
6
 See Appendix A for a detailed derivation of the economy’s resource constraint.   
7
 Eggertsson (2011) indicates that a negative natural rate shock is associated with an exogenous increase in the 
borrower’s default probability, which was the main feature of the subprime crisis.    
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3.1. Transitional dynamics under the interest rate rule regime 
We first analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy under an interest rate rule.  By 
using Eqs. (1) and (2) together with the interest rule 0t ti i    , we have the following 
dynamic system: 
1 1
0 0 0 0ˆ (1 )( 1) 0 ˆ ( (1 ) )
w
t t g t w t
a a n a
t t t t
g
c c i r i
      
      
                        . (4) 
Based on Eq. (4), we can easily infer the two eigenvalues 1  and 2  of the dynamic system 
as follows: 
 2 11 0ˆ4 (1 )( 1) / 2a            , (5) 
 2 12 0ˆ4 (1 )( 1) / 2a            . (6) 
In line with Galí (2015), to ensure that the dynamic system achieves a unique-stable 
equilibrium, we impose the restriction 0(1 ) 1a    .  Accordingly, given 1 0   and 2 0  , 
the dynamic system under the interest rate rule is associated with the feature of global instability.  
Based on Eqs. (4), (5), and (6), the general solution for t  and tc  is given by: 
1 2
1 2
t t
t Ae A e
     , (7) 
1 21 2
1 2
t t
tc c A e A e
    
 
             , (8) 
where   and c  are the steady-state values of t  and tc  under the interest rate rule regime, 
respectively, and 1A  and 2A  are undetermined coefficients.  We now turn to solve   and 
c
 under the interest rate rule regime.  At the steady-state equilibrium, the economy is 
characterized by 0t tc   .  Given that tg g , w wt   and a at   at the steady-state 
equilibrium, it is quite easy from Eq. (4) to derive the following steady-state results: 
 0 0( ) / (1 ) 1a n ai r          , (9) 
 0 0( ) / (1 ) 1 /a n a wg wc i r g                 , (10) 
To simplify the mathematical notation, we assume that the economy is initially (at time 
0t  ) in its steady state where the natural rate shock is absent and fiscal policies remain 
unchanged; that is 0nr   and 0 0 0 0a wg     .  By substituting these initial conditions into 
Eqs. (9) and (10) we can infer that the initial inflation and consumption are respectively given 
by: 
0 0   , 
0 0c c  . 
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Then, based on 0 0c c  , 0 0g  , and the economy’s resource constraint t t tc g y  ,8 the 
initial output is given by 0 0y  . 
The dynamic behavior of t  and tc  under the interest rate rule can be described in terms 
of a phase diagram as shown in Figure 1.  It is clear from Eq. (4) that the slopes of the loci 
0t   and 0tc   displayed in t  and tc  space are given by: 
0
0
t
t
t
c


 
   , 
1
0
0
ˆ (1 )( 1)
0
t
a
t
t c
c   



    . 
Equipped with information regarding the direction of the arrows, we can sketch all possible 
trajectories in Figure 1.  In the phase space plane, the unstable branches *UU  and UU  are 
associated with 1 0A   and 2 0A   in Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively.  All other unstable 
trajectories in the figure correspond to the values with 1 0A   and 2 0A   in (7) and (8).  The 
common feature of these divergent trajectories is that they start from the unstable node 0E  
with the slope UU , and their slope asymptotically approaches that of the *UU schedule.   
 
Figure 1. Phase diagram under the interest rate rule regime 
3.2 Transitional dynamics under the interest rate peg regime  
This subsection turns to analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy under an interest 
rate peg regime.  Using Eqs. (1) and (2) and the interest rate peg policy *ti i , we have: 
1 1 *
0 0
( )
ˆ 0 ˆ ((1 ) )
w
t t g t w t
a a n
t t t t
g
c c i i r
     
    
                        . (11) 
                                               
8
 See Appendix A for a derivation of the economy’s resource constraint.
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From Eq. (11) we can easily infer the two eigenvalues *1  and *2  of the dynamic system as 
follows: 
 * 2 11 ˆ4 / 2 0        , (12) 
 * 2 12 ˆ4 / 2 0        . (13) 
Eqs. (12) and (13) indicate that, just as in Farhi and Werning (2016) and Wieland (2019), the 
dynamic system under the interest rate peg regime has one positive and one negative root, i.e., 
* *
1 20   .  Equipped with Eqs. (11), (12), and (13), the general solutions for t  and tc  are: 
* *
1 2* *
1 2ˆ t tt A e A e     , (14) 
* *
1 2
* *
* *1 2
1 2ˆ t ttc c A e A e     
             , (15) 
where ˆ  and cˆ  denote the stationary values of inflation and consumption under the interest 
rate peg regime, and *1A  and *2A  are undetermined coefficients. 
We now proceed to examine the determination of ˆ  and cˆ  under the interest rate peg 
regime.  Given that tg g , w wt   and a at   at the steady-state equilibrium, it follows 
from Eq. (11) with 0t tc    that the following steady-state expressions can be derived: 
*
0 0ˆ (1 )a a ni i r      , (16) 
 *0 0ˆ (1 ) /a a n wg wc i i r g              . (17) 
Eqs. (16) and (17) indicate how government spending, payroll taxes, and financial assets taxes 
affect ˆ  and cˆ .  To simplify the notation, the above relationships can then be expressed as 
the following implicit functional forms: 
0ˆ ˆ ˆ( ); / 0a a i          , (16a) 
ˆ ˆ( , , );w ac c g  
 
ˆ ˆ/ / 0, / / 0,wg wc g c               
0ˆ / / 0ac i       . (17a) 
By inserting Eqs. (16a) and (17a) into Eqs. (14) and (15), the general solutions for t  and tc  
can then be rewritten as: 
* *
1 2* *
1 2ˆ( ) t tat A e A e      , (14a) 
* *
1 2
* *
* *1 2
1 2ˆ( , , ) t tw atc c g A e A e       
             . (15a) 
The evolution of t  and tc  under the interest rate peg can be illustrated by a phase 
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diagram as shown in Figure 2.  It is clear from Eq. (11) that the slopes of the loci 0t   and 
0tc   are given by: 
0
0
t
t
t
c


 
   ,  
1
0
ˆ
0
t
t
t c
c 



   . 
As indicated by the direction of the arrows in Figure 2, the lines UU and SS  represent 
the unstable and stable branches, respectively.  The UU  curve and the SS  curve 
respectively trace the locus of t  and tc  that satisfies *1 0A    and *2 0A   in Eqs. (14a) 
and (15a).  Evidently, the convergent saddle path SS  is upward sloping, while the divergent 
branch UU  is downward sloping.  All other unstable trajectories in the figure correspond to 
the values with *1 0A   and *2 0A   in Eqs. (14a) and (15a).  A common feature of these 
divergent trajectories is that they start with the slope of the SS  line and end with the slope of 
the UU  schedule. 
 
Figure 2. Phase diagram under the interest rate peg regime 
3.3 Deep recession 
The previous subsection illustrates the dynamic behavior of the economy under two 
distinct monetary regimes (i.e., the interest rate rule regime and the interest rate peg regime).  
In this subsection, we turn to discuss how the economy will react following a temporary 
negative natural rate shock when the monetary authority implements the temporary interest rate 
peg policy.  Our analysis shows that the economy will experience a deep recession during the 
period in which a negative natural rate shock is present.  Two points deserve mention here.  
First, according to Real Gross Domestic Product data provided by the database of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the time interval from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2-Q3 is marked as the 
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financial crisis period.  This practical data reveals that the financial crisis period lasts around 
5 or 6 quarters, and the duration is longer than the normal lasting time for the recession (two 
consecutive quarters of decline in real gross domestic output).9  With this observation, to make 
our analysis more clear, in this paper “the deep recession” is defined as a substantial fall in 
output at the beginning of the negative natural rate shock and the duration of the shock is 
moderately prolonged.  Second, in this subsection we will show that the economy falls into a 
deep recession if the monetary authority implements the zero lower bound (ZLB) interest rate 
policy and the fiscal authority does not implement any fiscal policies.  To shed light on 
whether the coordination between the ZLB interest rate policy and fiscal policies could lessen 
the extent of the deep recession, the situation discussed in this subsection (i.e., the ZLB interest 
rate policy without any supportive fiscal policies) is treated as the benchmark case.  
To make our analysis clearer, Figure 3 coupled with Eqs. (18) and (19) reported below are 
depicted to describe the process of regime switching.  For expository convenience, throughout 
the remainder of the paper 0  and 0  denote the instant before and instant after the beginning 
of an unanticipated shock, respectively; T   and T   denote the instant before and that after 
the ending of the shock, respectively.  As indicated in Figure 3 as well as Eqs. (18) and (19), 
the process of regime switching is depicted by means of the three stages.  In the first stage, at 
time  the economy is initially in its steady-state equilibrium and the monetary authority 
implements the interest rate rule regime (i.e., 0n ntr r  and 0t ti i    ).  In the second stage, 
the economy experiences an anticipated shock where the natural rate temporarily falls from 0nr  
to 1 0( 0 )n nr r   during the period from 0  to T  . 10   Faced with such an unfavorable 
situation, the monetary authority takes action to implement the ZLB interest rate policy under 
the interest rate peg regime (i.e., *ti i ).  Finally, in the third stage during the period from T   
onwards, the negative natural rate shock vanishes (i.e., the natural rate reverts back to 0nr ), and 
the monetary authority once again implements the interest rate rule regime (i.e., 0t ti i    ). 
 
Figure 3. The timing of regime switching  
Based on the above description, the evolution of the natural rate ntr  can be expressed as:  
                                               
9
 In their calibration analysis, Cochrane (2017) and Boneva et al. (2018) also set the crisis period to be around 5 
to 6 quarters. 
10
 Eggertsson (2011) deals with the uncertainty surrounding the ending date of the shock, i.e., the shock may revert 
back to its initial level with a specific probability.  To highlight the transitional dynamics during the entire 
period in which the shock is present, just as in Wieland (2019), we assume that the ending date of the shock is 
constant for simplicity.   
0
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, (18) 
Moreover, the evolution regarding the switch in the interest rate policy can be written as: 
0
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t
t
i t
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i T t
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. (19) 
It should be noticed once again that   is the responsiveness of ti  to t , and is a policy 
parameter determined by the monetary authority.  Eq. (19) indicates that during the period in 
which an adverse natural rate shock is present (the time horizon between 0  and T  ), the 
monetary authority implements a transient interest rate peg policy to make the interest rate 
remain intact at the sufficiently low and non-negative level *i . 
By using Eqs. (7), (8), (14a), and (15a) and recalling that the economy is initially in its 
steady-state equilibrium at time 0t  , the evolution of t  and tc  in association with 
distinct time intervals can be described as follows: 
* *
1 2
1 2
0
* *
0 1 2
0 1 2
; 0
ˆ( 0) ; 0
;
t ta
t
t t
t
A e A e t T
A e A e T t
 
 

  


 

         
, (20) 
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,  
 (21) 
where 0 0  , 0 0c  , *0 0ˆ( 0) (1 )a a ni r      , and  *0 0 0 0ˆ( 0) (1 ) /w a a nc g i r          .  
One point should be mentioned here.  To highlight that, in this benchmark case, the 
implementation of the ZLB interest rate policy is not matched with any supportive fiscal policy 
tools, we thus set 0w at t tg      for all t . 
As indicated in Eqs. (20) and (21), to trace the time paths of t  and tc  from 0  to T   
and from T   onwards, we must solve for the appropriate values of 1A , 2A , *1A , and *2A .  
These values are determined by two continuity conditions, T T    and T Tc c  , and two 
stability conditions, 1 0A   and 2 0A  .  The two continuity conditions indicate that the 
forward-looking variables t  and tc  cannot exhibit an anticipated discontinuity at the instant 
of realizing regime switching T  .  The two stability conditions state that the economy should 
move to its steady-state equilibrium at the instant when regime switching is realized, namely, 
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T  , because the dynamic system from T   onwards is characterized by global instability.11,12   
Inserting *0 0 1ˆ( 0) (1 )a a ni r      ,  *0 0 0 0 1ˆ( 0) (1 ) /w a a nc g i r          , 0 0  , 
0 0c  , T T   , T Tc c  , 1 0A  , and 2 0A   into Eqs. (20) and (21), we have: 
 * *1 2( ) ( )* * *2 1 0 1* *
2 1
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, (20a) 
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. (21a) 
Based on the economy’s resource constraint ( t t ty c g  ) together with 0tg   in this 
benchmark case, the evolution of ty  can then be expressed as: 
 * *1 2( ) ( )* * * * *2 2 1 1 0 1* *
2 1
0 ; 0
( ) ( ) (1 ) ; 0( )
0 ;
T t T t
a n
t
t
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T t
         

   
 

          
. (22) 
The evolution of both t  and tc  reported in (20a) and (21a) can be clearly illustrated 
by means of a graphical apparatus.  Before proceeding to study the dynamic adjustment of the 
economy, three points should be addressed.  First, as indicated in Figure 4, at time  the 
economy is assumed to be at its steady-state equilibrium 0E  , where the 0 00 ( , )wt g   line 
intersects the 0 0 00 ( , , )n atc i r   line, and the initial inflation rate and consumption level are 
0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.13  
                                               
11
 See, e.g., Turnovsky (2000, Ch. 7) for a detailed discussion on the continuity condition and the stability 
condition.   
12
 The stability condition is referred to as “the boundary conditions” by Wieland (2019).   
13 To avoid cluttering the diagram, we leave out labels 0   and 0c  . 
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Figure 4. The ZLB interest rate policy 
Second, during the time periods from 0  to T  , in response to the negative natural rate 
shock (i.e., a reduction in the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr ), to stabilize the economy the 
monetary authority implements its interest rate peg policy (i.e., the nominal interest rate is 
pegged to a sufficiently low level * 0( )i i ) in response.  Accordingly, following a decline of 
the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr  coupled with the nominal interest rate remaining fixed at the 
level * 0( )i i , the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line shifts rightwards to * 1 00 ( , , )n atc i r  , while the 
0 00( , )wt g   line remains intact.  The 0 00( , )wt g   line and the * 1 00 ( , , )n atc i r   line 
intersect at point IPE , where the inflation rate and the consumption level are ˆ IP  and ˆIPc , 
respectively.14  Given that during the dates between 0  to T   the natural rate remains at the 
1
n
r
 level and the nominal interest rate remains at the * 0( )i i  level, point IPE  should be 
treated as the reference point to govern the dynamic adjustment of t  and tc .   
Third, since the agents universally know that, at the moment T  , the negative natural rate 
shock will vanish and the monetary authority will recover to implement the interest rate rule, 
the economy should exactly move to its initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E   at that instant 
of time because the dynamic system from T   onwards is characterized by global instability. 
Based on the above three considerations, in Figure 4 at time 0  the economy will jump 
from point 0E   to 0E   on impact, and both the inflation rate and the consumption level will 
                                               
14
 The subscript “ IP ” indicates that the monetary authority implements an interest rate peg policy. 
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instantly decrease from 0   to 0   and from 0c   to 0c  , respectively.  Subsequently, from 
0  to T  , as the arrow indicates, the economy will gradually move from 0E   to TE  (it 
coincides with point 0E  ) in which both t  and tc  keep on rising.  At time T  , the 
negative natural rate shock vanishes and the monetary authority once again implements the 
interest rate rule such that the economy reaches point TE , which exactly coincides with the 
economy’s initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E  .  Thereafter, from T   onwards, the 
economy remains intact at point TE , and both t  and tc  remain intact at their initial values 
0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.   
It is quite clear from Figure 4 that, during the time interval between 0  and T  , even 
though the monetary authority implements the interest rate peg policy to lessen the unfavorable 
impact arising from the negative natural rate shock, the consumption level (which is equal to 
the output level) during this time interval is lower than its initial level.  In particular, the 
consumption (output) level of the earlier periods is sufficiently smaller than its initial level.  
This reveals that the economy experiences a deep recession coupled with deflation during the 
period in which the natural rate shock is present (i.e., the time interval between 0  to T  ). 
Appendix B provides a detailed analytical result to confirm the presence of a deep recession 
during the time period between 0  and T  , which is totally matched by the graphical 
exposition in Figure 4. 
For the economic intuition behind the outcome of the deep recession we can refer to the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve and the IS curve reported in Eqs. (1) and (2).  Equipped with 
these two equations, we can infer that both tc  and t  are characterized by the following 
forward-looking traits:  
 1 *0 1ˆ (1 )T a nt stc i r ds       ; 0 t T   , (23a) 
( )T s t
t st
e c ds     ; 0 t T   . (23b) 
Eq. (23a) indicates that, upon the news of a temporary decline in nr  from 0nr  to 1nr  during 
the time periods between 0  and T  , the forward-looking household knows that the real 
interest rate will rise during this specific time frame.  By means of the intertemporal 
substitution effect in consumption, the household is motivated to increase its savings and lower 
its current consumption discretely on impact.  Moreover, we can infer from Eq. (23a) that tc  
will keep on rising during the periods between 0  and T   since 1nr  remains intact during 
this time interval.   
Eq. (23b) reveals the following forward-looking feature.  Based on the result that a 
reduction in the consumption level takes place (compared with its initial value) between  
and T  , the forward-looking firm recognizes that the goods market exhibits a significant 
shortage in demand, thereby leading the firm to lower the pricing (and hence the inflation rate) 
with a discrete adjustment at time 0 .  In addition, given that tc  displays a rising tendency 
0
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over time from 0  to T  , we can infer from Eq. (23b) that t  also exhibits an increasing 
adjustment pattern during this period.   
Based on the discussions in this subsection, we can establish the following Proposition: 
Proposition 1.  When the monetary authority implements a zero interest rate policy to dampen 
the negative natural rate shock, the economy will sink into a deep recession with deflation. 
In order to clearly show the time paths of output and the inflation rate during the period of 
the deep recession for this benchmark case, we offer a quantitative assessment by resorting to 
numerical analysis.  The parameters we set are adopted from commonly-used values in the 
existing New Keynesian literature.  In line with Kaszab (2016), the inverse of the 
intertemporal consumption substitution elasticity   and the inverse of the intertemporal labor 
supply substitution elasticity   are both set to 1.  As in Wieland (2019) the discount rate   
is set to 0.02.  According to Galí (2015), the probability of resetting prices   is set to 1/4.  
In line with Corsetti et al. (2010) and Collard et al. (2017), the government spending share 
0 0( / )g G Y   is set to 0.2, which is consistent with the U.S. data.  By following Boneva et al. 
(2018), to match a fall in output of around 7.5% in the U.S. during the financial crisis period, 
the temporary natural rate shock is calibrated to decrease from 2% to -0.83%.  According to 
Real Gross Domestic Product data provided by the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, the time interval from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2-Q3 is marked as the financial crisis period, 
and hence the time period for the presence of a temporary natural rate shock T  is set to 6 (in 
terms of the number of quarters).  As in Eggertsson (2011), the initial payroll tax rate 0w  is 
set to 0.2.  Finally, by following Bullard and Russell (1999), the initial financial assets tax rate 
0
a
 is set to 0.2. 
In Figure 5, in association with the benchmark case where the government implements the 
sole ZLB interest rate policy, the gray curve in the upper and lower panels depicts the time 
paths of output and the inflation rate, respectively.  As exhibited by the gray curve in both 
panels of Figure 5, at the instant where the economy experiences an anticipated temporary 
natural rate shock, output will immediately fall by about 7.5% and the inflation rate will 
immediately decline by about 2.5%.  During the time periods in which the temporary natural 
rate shock is present, both output and the inflation rate will keep on rising and will gradually 
return to their initial levels.  Obviously, as displayed in the upper panel, the output level along 
the transition path (in particular, the first few periods) will fall far below its initial level, and 
the economy will thereby suffer from a deep recession even though the monetary authority 
implements the ZLB interest rate policy to dampen the negative effect of the natural rate shock. 
 15
 
 
 
Figure 5: The time paths of output and the inflation rate. 
4. Feasible fiscal policies 
As shown in the previous section, the sole ZLB interest rate policy is incapable of fully 
dampening the impact of the natural rate shock, thereby causing the economy to sink into a 
deep recession.  Based on the inability of the monetary policy to overcome the deep recession, 
in this section we turn to discuss whether there exist feasible fiscal policies that are able to lead 
the economy to escape from the deep recession at the ZLB interest rate.  
In this section, the available fiscal policies that we consider include expansionary 
government spending, a payroll tax cut, and a financial assets tax cut.  It needs to be 
emphasized here that, as pointed out in Eq. (A15) reported in Appendix A, the government will 
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balance its budget by means of adjusting the lump-sum tax when it implements each of the 
available fiscal policies.  Given that in the previous section we have provided a detailed 
analysis regarding why in the benchmark case (i.e., the ZLB interest rate in the absence of fiscal 
policies) the economy would suffer from a deep recession during the period in which a negative 
natural rate shock is present, to save space this section will briefly discuss which kinds of fiscal 
policies would be able to attenuate the economy’s deep recession following a temporary natural 
rate shock.  
4.1 Dynamic adjustment of expansionary government spending 
The first fiscal policy we consider is expansionary government spending.  Under such a 
situation, both the payroll tax and financial assets tax remain intact at their initial levels (i.e., 
0w at t   ) and government spending rises from its initial level 0g  to 1g .  Given that the 
mathematical derivations for the evolutional dynamics of t , tc , and ty  are similar to those 
in association with the sole ZLB interest rate policy, for convenience of presentation, the 
detailed proof underlying this case is relegated to Appendix C.  
We now present a graphical analysis to discuss how the economy will react following a 
temporary negative natural rate shock when the government implements an expansionary fiscal 
policy coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy.  Our analytical result shows that the economy 
will generate different types of dynamic paths according to the increased size of government 
spending.  Accordingly, in what follows, we will deal with two distinctive scenarios in light 
of the relatively increased size in government spending (this reflects the different extents of the 
downward shift in the =0t  locus).   
The upper panel in Figure 6 depicts the scenario where an expansion in government 
spending is relatively low (hence a fiscal expansion leads to a relatively small shift in the =0t  
locus).  In the upper panel of Figure 6, similar to the graphical illustration in Figure 4, at time 
 the economy is initially established at its steady-state equilibrium 0E  , where the 
0 00( , )wt g   line intersects the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line, and the initial inflation rate and the 
consumption level are 0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.  
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Figure 6. Expansionary government spending coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy 
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During the time periods from 0  to T  , when the negative natural rate shock is enacted 
(i.e., a reduction in the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr ), to stabilize the economy the monetary 
authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy (i.e., the nominal interest rate is pegged at a 
sufficiently low level * 0( )i i ) and the fiscal authority implements an expansionary fiscal policy 
to increase its spending from 0g  to 1g .  Accordingly, following a decline in the natural rate 
from 0nr  to 1nr , a reduction in the nominal interest rate from 0i  to *i , and an expansion in 
government spending from 0g  to 1g , the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line and 0 00( , )wt g   line shift 
rightward to * 1 00( , , )n atc i r   and 1 00( , )wt g  , respectively.  The 1 00 ( , )wt g   line and the 
*
1 00 ( , , )n atc i r   line intersect at point gE , where the inflation rate and the consumption level 
are ˆg  and ˆgc , respectively.  As the upper panel in Figure 6 describes the scenario where an 
expansion in government spending is relatively low, a fiscal expansion from 0g  to 1g  then 
leads to a relatively small shift in the 0t   curve from 0 00( , )wt g   to 1 00 ( , )wt g  . 
Given that during the dates between 0  to T  , the natural rate, the nominal interest rate, 
and government spending remain intact at the levels 1nr , *i , and 1g , respectively, point gE  
should be treated as the reference point to govern the dynamic adjustment of t  and tc .  
Since the public becomes aware that, at the moment T  , the natural rate will revert back to its 
initial level 0nr , the monetary authority will once again implement the interest rate rule (i.e., 
0t ti i    ), and government spending will be restored to its initial level 0g , the economy 
should exactly move to its initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E   at that instant in time 
because the dynamic system from T   onwards is characterized by global instability.  As 
clearly indicated in the upper panel of Figure 6, the dynamic path 0
g
TE E  (point TE  coincides 
with point 0E  ) could lead the economy back to its initial steady-state equilibrium 0E   
when gE  is treated as the reference point for the dynamic adjustment of t  and tc .  
Accordingly, upon the arrival of the news of a temporary negative natural rate shock at the 
instant , the economy will instantly jump from point 0E   to 0gE   on impact, and both the 
inflation rate and the consumption level will decline instantly from 0 0    to 0g   and 0 0c    
to 0
gc  , respectively.  Subsequently, from  to T  , as the arrow indicates, the economy will 
move from point 0
gE   to TE  (it coincides with point 0E  ) along which t  first increases and 
then decreases over time, while tc  keeps on rising.  At time T  , the negative natural rate 
shock vanishes,15 and the economy arrives at point TE , which exactly coincides with the 
economy’s initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E  .  Thereafter, from T   onwards, the 
economy remains intact at point TE , and both t  and tc  remain intact at their initial values 
0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively. 
                                               
15
 It should be noted that, when the negative natural rate shock vanishes at the instant , the monetary authority 
once again implements the interest rate rule and the fiscal authority restores the government spending to its 
initial level.   
0
0
T 
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The lower panel in Figure 6 portrays the scenario where an expansion in government 
spending is relatively high.  When compared with the upper panel in Figure 6, it is clearly 
observed that the vertical shift in the 0t   curve from 0 00( , )wt g   to 1 00 ( , )wt g   in the 
lower panel is significantly greater than that in the upper panel.  Following a similar 
illustration to that for the upper panel, during the dates between 0  to T  , gE  is treated as 
the reference point to govern the dynamic adjustment of t  and tc , and only one dynamic 
path 0
g
TE E   (point TE  coincides with point 0E  ) could lead the economy back to its initial 
steady-state equilibrium 0E  .  As a result, at the instant 0 , the economy will instantly jump 
from point 0E   to 0
gE 
 on impact, the inflation rate will instantly rise from 0 0    to 0g   
and the consumption level will fall from 0 0c    to 0gc  .  Subsequently, from 0  to T  , as 
the arrow indicates, the economy will move from point 0
gE 
 to TE  (it coincides with point 
0E  ) along which tc  first decreases and then increases over time, while t  keeps on falling.  
At time , the economy reaches its initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E  .  Thereafter, 
from  onwards, the economy remains intact at point +TE , and both t  and tc  remain 
intact at their initial values 0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively. 
By comparing both panels in Figure 6, it is observed that the dynamic paths are quite 
different.  In particular, during the dates between 0  to T  , the economy is characterized by 
deflation inertia if the rise in government spending is relatively low, while it is characterized 
by inflation inertia if the rise in government spending is relatively high. 
To highlight whether the additional fiscal policy in the form of expansionary government 
spending is helpful in leading the economy to escape from a deep recession at the ZLB interest 
rate, in both panels of Figure 6 we re-portray the * 1 00( , , )n atc i r   line, the 0 00( , )wt g   line, 
and the dynamic path 0 TE E  in Figure 4 under the sole ZLB interest rate policy.  By 
comparing the dynamic path of 0
g
TE E  with that of 0 TE E , it is clear that at any point in time 
[0 , ]t T 
 the consumption level in association with the dynamic path of 0
g
TE E  is higher 
than that in association with the dynamic path of 0 TE E .  Coupled with the fact that the 
government spending level in association with the dynamic path of 0
g
TE E  (i.e., 1g ) exceeds 
that in association with the dynamic path of 0 TE E  (i.e., 0g ), we can conclude that at any 
point in time [0 , ]t T   the output level in association with the dynamic path of 0g TE E  is 
greater than that in association with the dynamic path of 0 TE E .  As a result, the expansionary 
government spending policy could mitigate the extent of the deep recession, or may possibly 
lead to a boom in output if the rise in government spending is relatively high.  Appendix C 
provides a detailed analytical result to confirm the graphical exposition in Figure 6. 
For the economic intuition as to why the additional fiscal policy in the form of 
expansionary government spending can alleviate the deep recession, we can refer to the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve and the IS curve reported in Eqs. (1) and (2).  Based on these two 
T
T 
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equations, we can infer that both tc  and t  can be represented by the following forward-
looking expressions:  
 1 *0 1ˆ (1 )T a nt stc i r ds       ; 0 t T   , (24a) 
( )
1( )
T
s t
t s gt
e c g ds     ; 0 t T   .  (24b) 
Eq. (24b) indicates that, in the face of a temporary decline in nr  from 0nr  to 1nr  during the 
period between  and , the forward-looking household knows that, with an additional rise 
in government spending from 0g  to 1g , there are two possibilities.  First, t  will fall if the 
rise in government spending is relatively low, and the magnitude of the reduction in inflation 
t  will decrease compared to the sole ZLB interest rate policy.  Second, t  will rise if the 
rise in government spending is relatively high.  As indicated in Eq. (24a), both possibilities 
will lead to a reduction in the real interest rate, and hence result in a decline in the return on 
savings.  As a consequence, with an additional fiscal policy in the form of expansionary 
government spending, the household is motivated to lower its savings by raising its 
consumption level. 
Summing up the above discussion, we have the following Proposition: 
Proposition 2.  When the monetary authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy to 
dampen the negative natural rate shock, the additional fiscal policy in the form of expansionary 
government spending could lessen the extent of the deep recession. 
The result exhibited in Figure 6 whereby the expansionary government spending policy 
could mitigate the extent of a deep recession can be confirmed with the help of numerical 
analysis.  By using the same parameters as those in the benchmark case, we can portray the 
time path of output and the inflation rate in association with an additional policy in the form of 
a rise in government spending.  As our analytical and graphical results in Figure 6 reveal that 
the economy will generate different types of dynamic paths depending upon whether an 
expansion in government spending is relatively low or high, we thus present two different 
values for a rise in government spending.  In both panels of Figure 5, the black line depicts 
the responses to a 2% rise in government spending, while the dashed line portrays the responses 
to a 5% rise in government spending.  As indicated by the black curve in both panels of Figure 
5, at the moment of the enactment of an anticipated temporary natural rate shock, output will 
instantly decrease by about 2.8% and the inflation rate will immediately fall by about 1.0%.  
Thereafter, during the time periods in which the temporary natural rate shock is present, both 
output and the inflation rate will continue to rise and will gradually return to their initial levels.  
At the instant in which the negative natural rate shock vanishes, output experiences a discrete 
reduction since government spending reverts back to its initial level.   
In addition, as indicated by the dashed curve in both panels of Figure 5, at the instant in 
which an anticipated temporary natural rate shock is enacted, output will instantly rise by about 
0 T 
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4.1% and the inflation rate will immediately rise by about 1.2%.  Thereafter, during the time 
periods in which the temporary natural rate shock is present, output will first rise then fall, while 
the inflation rate will keep on falling.  As exhibited by the dashed curves in both panels of 
Figure 5, following a 5% rise in government spending (this reflects the fact that the expansion 
in government spending is relatively high), a boom in output coupled with inflation (rather than 
deflation) is present during the time periods in which the temporary natural rate shock is enacted.  
At the moment in which the negative natural rate shock vanishes, output exhibits a discrete 
reduction since government spending reverts back to its initial level. 
By comparing the gray curve, the black curve, and the dashed line in the upper panel of 
Figure 5, we can find that both the dashed curve and the black curve lie entirely above the gray 
curve, implying that, during the period in which the anticipated temporary natural rate shock is 
present, the output level in association with an additional expansionary government spending 
policy is greater than that in association with the benchmark case.  As a consequence, the 
additional fiscal policy in the form of expansionary government spending could serve as a 
powerful policy instrument to lessen the extent of the deep recession.16 
4.2 Dynamic adjustment of the payroll tax cut 
The second fiscal policy that we consider is the payroll tax cut.  Under such a situation, 
both government spending and the financial assets tax remain unchanged at their initial levels 
(i.e., 0at tg   ) and the payroll tax rate declines from its initial level of 0w  to 1w .  Similar 
to subsection 4.1, we only provide graphical analysis for the evolutional dynamics of t  and 
tc , and the relevant mathematical derivations underlying this situation are relegated to 
Appendix D.  
                                               
16
 One point should be noted regarding the time path of  in the upper panel of Figure 5.  As the negative 
natural rate shock disappears at the instant T  , the fiscal authority tends to lower its government spending 
from 1g  to the initial level .  Therefore, as displayed by the black curve in the upper panel of Figure 5, 
the level  reveals a discrete reduction at the instant T  . 
ty
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Figure 7. The payroll tax cut coupled with the interest rate peg policy 
Figure 7 presents a graphical illustration to describe the adjustment process of the economy 
in response to a temporary negative natural rate shock when the government implements the 
payroll tax cut policy coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy.  In Figure 7, similar to the 
graphical illustration in Figure 4, at time 0  the economy is initially established at its steady-
state equilibrium 0E  , where the 0 00( , )wt g   line intersects the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line, and the 
initial inflation rate and the consumption level are 0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.  
During the dates between 0  to , in response to the negative natural rate shock (i.e., a 
reduction in the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr ), to stabilize the economy the monetary authority 
implements the ZLB interest rate policy (i.e., the nominal interest rate is pegged at a sufficiently 
low level * 0( )i i ) and the fiscal authority implements the payroll tax cut policy (i.e., the payroll 
tax rate falls from 0w  to 1w ).  Accordingly, given that the natural rate decreases from 0nr  to 
1
n
r , the nominal interest rate remains constant at the level * 0( )i i , and the payroll tax rate falls 
from 0w  to 1w , the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line shifts rightward to * 1 00( , , )n atc i r   and the 
0 00( , )wt g   line shifts leftward to 0 10( , )wt g  , respectively.  The 0 10( , )wt g   line and 
the * 1 00( , , )n atc i r   line intersect at point wE , where the inflation rate and the consumption 
level are ˆw  and ˆwc , respectively.  Given that 1n nr r , *i i , and 1w w   during the dates 
 
T 
 23
 
between 0  to T  , point wE  should be treated as the reference point to govern the dynamic 
adjustment of t  and tc . 
Based on a similar illustration in Figure 6, upon the arrival of the news of a temporary 
negative natural rate shock at the instant 0 , the economy jumps from point 0E   to 0wE   on 
impact, and both the inflation rate and the consumption level immediately decline from 0 0    
to 0
w   and 0 0c    to 0wc  , respectively.  Subsequently, from 0  to T  , as the arrows 
indicate, the economy moves from 0
wE   to TE  (it coincides with point 0E  ) along which both 
t  and tc  continue to rise.  At time T  , the negative natural rate shock vanishes, the 
monetary authority once again implements the interest rate rule and the fiscal authority restores 
the payroll tax rate to its initial level.  At that moment, the economy reaches point TE , which 
exactly coincides with the economy’s initial steady-state equilibrium point 0E  .  Thereafter, 
from T   onwards, the economy stays intact at point TE , and both t  and tc  remain intact 
at their initial values 0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.  
    To shed light on whether the additional fiscal policy in the form of the payroll tax cut is 
beneficial to mitigate the extent of the deep recession at the ZLB, in Figure 7 we re-portray the 
*
1 00( , , )n atc i r   line, the 0 00( , )wt g   line, and the dynamic path 0 TE E  exhibited in Figure 
4 under the sole ZLB interest rate policy.  By comparing the dynamic path of 0
w
TE E  with that 
of 0 TE E , it is clear that at any point in time [0 , ]t T   the consumption level in association 
with the dynamic path of 0
w
TE E  is lower than that in association with the dynamic path of 
0 TE E .  Given that the government spending level in association with 0
w
TE E  is equal to that 
in association with 0 TE E  (i.e., 0 0g  ), we can assert that at any point in time [0 , ]t T   the 
output level in association with the dynamic path of 0
w
TE E  is smaller than that in association 
with the dynamic path of 0 TE E .  As a result, the additional fiscal policy in the form of the 
payroll tax cut tends to further deepen (rather than help alleviate) the recession.  Appendix D 
provides a detailed analytical result to confirm the graphical exposition in Figure 7. 
For the intuition underlying the reinforcement of the deep recession in association with the 
payroll tax cut policy, we can also refer to the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the IS curve 
expressed in Eqs. (1) and (2).  Based on these two equations, both tc  and t  can be 
expressed in the following forward-looking manner:  
 1 *0 1ˆ (1 )T a nt stc i r ds       ; 0 t T   , (25a) 
( )
1( )
T
s t w
t s wt
e c ds      ; 0 t T   . (25b) 
Eq. (25b) clearly indicates that, in the face of a temporary decline in nr  from 0nr  to 1nr  
during the period between 0  and , the forward-looking household knows that, with an 
additional reduction in the payroll tax from 0w  to 1w , the magnitude of the reduction in 
T 
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inflation t  will be greater compared to that for the sole ZLB interest rate policy.  By 
referring to Eq. (25a), this will lead to a higher real interest rate, and hence the household will 
be motivated to increase its savings via a contraction in its consumption level. 
 The above discussion leads us to establish the following Proposition: 
Proposition 3.  When the monetary authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy to 
dampen the negative natural rate shock, a fiscal policy in the form of a payroll tax cut will 
further exacerbate the deep recession. 
The result displayed in Figure 7 can also be confirmed by resorting to numerical 
simulations.  By using the same parameters as those in the benchmark case, we can depict the 
starred curve in the upper and lower panels in Figure 5, which respectively illustrate the time 
path of output and the inflation rate in association with an additional fiscal policy in the form 
of a 5% cut in the payroll tax.  As indicated by the starred curve in both panels of Figure 5, at 
the moment that an anticipated temporary natural rate shock is enacted, output will instantly 
decrease by about 15.8% and the inflation rate will immediately fall by about 7.0%.  
Thereafter, during the time periods in which the temporary natural rate shock is present, both 
output and the inflation rate will continue to rise and will gradually revert back to their initial 
levels.  By comparing the gray curve and the starred curve in the upper panel of Figure 5, it is 
found that the starred curve lies entirely below the gray curve, and this result clearly indicates 
that a fiscal policy in the form of a payroll tax cut will further exacerbate the extent of the deep 
recession. 
4.3 Dynamic adjustment of the financial assets tax cut  
The third fiscal policy that we deal with is the financial assets tax cut.  Under such a 
situation, both government spending and the payroll tax remain fixed at their initial levels (i.e., 
0wt tg   ) and the financial assets tax falls from its initial level 0a  to 1a .  Similar to the 
previous two subsections, we only provide a graphical analysis for the evolutional dynamics of 
t  and tc , and the detailed mathematical derivations underlying this situation are presented 
in Appendix E.  
Figure 8 provides a graphical treatment regarding the transitional dynamics of the 
economy, in which the government implements the financial tax cut policy coupled with the 
ZLB interest rate policy during the period in which a temporary negative natural rate shock is 
present.  In Figure 8, similar to the graphical illustration in Figure 4, at time 0  the economy 
is initially established at its steady-state equilibrium 0E  , where the 0 00( , )wt g   line 
intersects the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line, and the initial inflation rate and the consumption level are 
0 0    and 0 0c   , respectively.  
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Figure 8. The financial assets tax cut coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy 
 During the dates between 0  to T  , in response to the negative natural rate shock (i.e., 
a reduction of the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr ), to stabilize the economy the monetary authority 
will implement the ZLB interest rate policy (i.e., the nominal interest rate is pegged to a 
sufficiently low level * 0( )i i ) and the fiscal authority will implement the financial tax cut 
policy (i.e., the payroll tax rate declines from 0a  to 1a ).  Accordingly, following a decline 
in the natural rate from 0nr  to 1nr , a reduction in the nominal interest rate from 0i  to *i , and 
a cut in the financial tax rate from 0a  to 1a , the 0 0 00( , , )n atc i r   line shifts rightwards to 
*
1 10( , , )n atc i r  , while the 0 00( , )wt g   line remains intact.  The 0 00( , )wt g   line and the 
*
1 10( , , )n atc i r   line intersect at point aE  with the inflation rate and the consumption level 
being ˆ ˆ( )a IP   and ˆ ˆ( )a IPc c , respectively.  Given that 1n nr r , *i i , and 1a a   during 
the dates between 0  to T  , point aE  should be treated as the reference point to govern the 
dynamic adjustment of t  and tc . 
In Figure 8, similar to the graphical illustration in Figure 4, at the instant 0  the economy 
jumps from point 0E   to 0aE   on impact, and both the inflation rate and the consumption level 
immediately decline from 0 0    to 0a   and 0 0c    to 0ac  , respectively.  Thereafter, 
from 0  to T  , as the arrows indicate, the economy gradually moves from 0
aE   to TE  (it 
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coincides with point 0E  ), along which both t  and tc  keep on rising.  At time T  , the 
negative natural rate shock vanishes, the monetary authority once again implements the interest 
rate rule, and the fiscal authority restores the financial tax rate to its initial level.  At that 
moment, the economy reaches point TE , which exactly coincides with the economy’s initial 
steady-state equilibrium point 0E  .  Thereafter, from T   onwards, the economy remains 
intact at point TE , and both t  and tc  remain intact at their initial values 0 0    and 
0 0c   , respectively. 
To examine whether an additional fiscal policy in the form of a financial asset tax cut is 
able to lessen the extent of the deep recession at the ZLB, in Figure 8 we re-portray the 
*
1 00( , , )n atc i r   line, the 0 00( , )wt g   line, and the dynamic path 0 TE E  exhibited in Figure 
4 under the sole ZLB interest rate policy.  By comparing the dynamic path of 0
a
TE E  with that 
of 0 TE E , it is clear that at any point in time [0 , ]t T   the consumption level in association 
with the dynamic path of 0
a
TE E  is lower than that in association with the dynamic path of 
0 TE E .  Given that the government spending level in association with the dynamic path of 
0
a
TE E  is equal to that in association with the dynamic path of 0 TE E  (i.e., 0 0g  ), we can 
then infer that at any point in time [0 , ]t T   the output level in association with the dynamic 
path of 0
a
TE E  is smaller than that in association with the dynamic path of 0 TE E .  
Accordingly, the additional fiscal policy in the form of the financial assets tax cut will further 
deepen the already deep recession.  Appendix E provides a detailed analytical result to confirm 
the graphical exposition in Figure 8. 
We can briefly describe the economic intuition underlying the reinforcement of the deep 
recession by referring to the IS curve reported in Eq. (2).  It is quite easy to infer from Eq. (2) 
that tc  is characterized by the following forward-looking feature:  
 1 *0 0 1 1ˆ (1 )T a a nt stc i i r ds         ; 0 t T   . (26) 
Eq. (26) indicates that, in the face of a temporary decline in nr  from 0nr  to 1nr  during the 
period between 0  and T  , the forward-looking household knows that, with an additional 
reduction in the financial assets tax from 0a  to 1a , the return on holding assets (i.e., the return 
on savings) will rise in response.  This will encourage the forward-looking household to 
increase its savings matched by a reduction in its consumption.   
The above discussion leads us to establish the following Proposition: 
Proposition 4.  When the monetary authority implements the ZLB interest rate policy to 
dampen the negative natural rate shock, a fiscal policy in the form of a financial assets tax cut 
will further deepen the deep recession.   
By resorting to the numerical analysis, we can verify the result displayed in Figure 8.  The 
dotted lines in the upper and lower panels in Figure 5 respectively depict the time path of output 
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and the inflation rate in association with an additional fiscal policy in the form of a 5% cut in 
the financial assets tax.  As indicated by the dotted curve in both panels of Figure 5, at the 
moment where an anticipated temporary natural rate shock is enacted, output will instantly 
decrease by about 8.4% and the inflation rate will immediately fall by about 2.8%.  Thereafter, 
during the time interval in which the temporary natural rate shock is present, both output and 
the inflation rate will continue to rise and gradually revert back to their initial levels.  By 
comparing the gray curve and the dotted curve in the upper panel of Figure 5, it is found that 
the dotted curve is fully located below the gray curve, and this result clearly reveals that a fiscal 
policy in the form of a financial tax cut will exacerbate the deep recession. 
5. Conclusion 
To lessen the severity of a deep recession during a financial crisis period, many countries 
have been forced to implement a ZLB interest rate policy.  However, they have usually found 
that the sole ZLB interest rate policy has been insufficient to dampen such a recession in the 
face of a catastrophic crisis.  Faced with this problem, various fiscal policies involving 
expansionary government spending and tax cuts have been proposed and implemented to 
support the ZLB interest rate policy during the crisis period.   
Even though the monetary authority has implemented a zero lower bound (ZLB) interest 
rate policy during the time interval of the financial crisis, the public fully recognizes that the 
financial crisis will come to an end at a future date.  From then on, the monetary authority will 
once again implement the original interest rate adjustment rule (the Taylor rule).  As a result, 
the implementation of the ZLB interest rate policy during the financial crisis period is 
characterized as being temporary since it only lasts for a specific period.  Accordingly, it 
would be plausible for the implementation of the ZLB interest rate policy to involve regime 
switching between the interest rate peg regime and the interest rate adjustment regime. 
Based on the above observations, this paper constructs a New Keynesian model, and uses 
it to explore whether supportive fiscal instruments (including expansionary government 
spending, a payroll tax cut, and a financial assets tax cut) are effective in alleviating the adverse 
impact of a deep recession from the regime-switching viewpoint.  Compared to the existing 
literature on the financial crisis, the dynamic analysis of this paper has the following two 
distinctive traits.  First, this paper provides a complete analytical solution of the dynamic 
analysis in explaining whether each of the supportive fiscal instruments can help alleviate the 
negative impact of the financial crisis.  Second, this paper develops a simple graphical 
exposition, and uses it to provide an intuitive explanation for the analytical solution.  Third, 
this paper proposes a new dynamic viewpoint of regime switching to evaluate the performance 
of each supportive fiscal policy.   
Two main findings emerge from the analysis.  First, when the monetary authority 
implements the ZLB interest rate policy to dampen the negative natural rate shock, the economy 
will sink into a deep recession with deflation.  Second, to overcome the deep recession, of the 
three supportive fiscal tools (i.e., expansionary government spending, a payroll tax cut, and a 
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financial assets tax cut), only expansionary government spending is effective in terms of helping 
pull the economy out of the deep recession.  More specifically, the implementation of a fiscal 
policy in the form of either a payroll tax cut or a financial assets tax cut will only serve to further 
deepen the recession. 
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Appendix A  
This Appendix provides a detailed derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the IS 
curve, and the economy’s resource constraint reported in Eqs. (1), (2), and (3).   
A.1 Households 
The representative household derives utility from consumption tC  and incurs disutility 
from working tL .  The lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:  
1 1
0 1 1
t t t
t
C L
e dt
 
   
        ; , , 0    . (A.1) 
The parameter   is the constant rate of the time preference,   and   are the inverse of the 
intertemporal consumption substitution elasticity and the inverse of the intertemporal labor 
supply substitution elasticity, respectively, and t  is an exogenous preference shock. 
The household’s budget constraint can be expressed as: 
(1 ) (1 )a wt t t t t t t t t t tB i B W L D PC T        , (A.2) 
where tP  is the aggregate price level, tW  is the nominal wage, ti  is the nominal interest rate 
of the bond which is controlled by the monetary authority, tB  is the holdings of the risk-free 
government bond, tD  is the distributed nominal profits from the firms, at  is the financial 
assets tax rate, wt  is the payroll tax rate, and tT  is the lump-sum tax. 
Let t  denote the shadow value of the bonds.  The optimum conditions for the 
representative household with respect to the indicated variables are: 
:t t t t tC C P
   , (A.3) 
: (1 )wt t t t t tL L W    , (A.4) 
: (1 )at t t t t tB i       , (A.5) 
: (1 ) (1 )a wt t t t t t t t t t t tB i B W L D PC T         . (A.6) 
From Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4), the optimality condition for labor supply is given by: 
 (1 ) /wt t t t tL W P C    . (A.7) 
Equipped with Eqs. (A.3) and (A.5), the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule can be written as: 
 1/ (1 )a nt t t t t tC C i r       (A.8) 
where ( )nt t tr      and t  is the inflation rate. It is quite clear that ntr  is a combination 
of the exogenous discount rate   and the change rate in the exogenous preference shock t t  , 
and hence ntr  is treated as an exogenous natural rate shock in our analysis. 
A.2 Firms 
We are now in a position to deal with the production side of the economy.  The 
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production side consists of two sectors (final goods and intermediate goods) and is 
characterized as follows: (a) the final goods market is perfectively competitive, and each of the 
final goods firms utilizes a continuum of intermediate goods to produce its goods; and (b) the 
intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive, and each of the intermediate goods 
firms utilizes the labor input to produce its goods.  We then deal with the optimal behavior of 
these two kinds of firms.  
The competitive final goods producer uses a continuum of intermediate goods ( )tY j , 
[0,1]j , to produce its goods tY .  The technology for producing the final good can be 
described by a standard CES production function with a constant elasticity of substitution 0  : 
1 11
0
( )t tY Y j dj

 

      ; 0  . (A.9) 
Let ( )tP j  denote the price of ( )tY j .  The maximization problem of the final goods firm 
can be expressed as: 
1
0( )
[ ( ) ( ) ]
t
t t t tY j
Max PY P j Y j dj  . (A.10) 
The first-order condition of Eq. (A.10) yields the standard demand function for ( )tY j  as: 
( )( ) tt t
t
P jY j Y
P
    
. (A.11) 
Given the fact that the final goods market is perfectly competitive, the zero-profit condition 
for the final good sector implies that the price index is given by: 
  11 110 ( )t tP P j dj    . (A.12) 
We then deal with the optimal behavior of the intermediate goods firms.  The 
intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive.  In line with Wieland (2019), we 
suppose that each of the intermediate goods firms uses only labor to produce its output, and one 
unit of labor produces one unit of the intermediate good.  The production function can then be 
expressed as ( ) ( )t tY j L j , where ( )tL j  is the labor input used by the j th firm. 
Following Calvo (1983) and Wieland (2019), we assume that the j th intermediate goods 
firm resets its price with probability   in each period, for [0,1]  .  The intermediate goods 
producer j  determines its optimal price subject to its demand functions reported in Eq. (A.11).  
Thus, the optimal price setting problem of the j th firm can be expressed as: 
*
*
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t
s t t s
s s stP j
s s
P j WMax e C Y j L j ds
P P
           , (A.13) 
where *( )tP j  is the optimal price set by the j th intermediate goods firm.  As in Wieland 
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(2019), tC   captures the contingent valuation of the firm’s profit.  The optimality condition 
for the j th producer is to reset its real price as follows: 
( )( )
*
0
( )( ) 1
0
( / )( / )( )
1 ( / )
s t
s s s t s st
s t
t
s t s s
e C W P P P Y dsP j
P e C P P Y ds
   
   


     
     
 

 . (A.14) 
Eq. (A.14) indicates that the firm’s optimal pricing decision reflects the forward-looking trait.  
To be more specific, as indicated in Eq. (A.14), the producer makes its price-setting decision at 
time t  in light of the discounted value of the stream of nominal marginal cost in all future 
periods. 
A.3 Fiscal authority 
The government finances its expenditures on fiscal spending and interest payments by 
levying taxes (including the payroll tax, financial assets tax and lump-sum tax) and by issuing 
risk-free bonds.  Therefore, the government’s budget constraint can be written as: 
(1 )a wt t t t t t t t t tB PG i B W L T      . (A.15) 
This study assumes that the government implements fiscal policies (in the form of an expansion 
in tG , or a decline in wt , or a decline in at ) by means of adjusting the lump-sum tax rather 
than issuing risk-free bonds.  
A.4 Monetary authority 
In line with Carlstrom et al. (2015), we specify that the monetary authority implements 
distinct interest rate rules in normal times and during the crisis period.  To be specific, in 
normal times (in the absence of a negative natural rate shock), the monetary authority follows 
a simple interest rate rule that may be expressed as: 
0
1 (1 )
1
t
t
i
i
   , (A.16) 
where   represents the policy parameters of the inflation targeting which is determined by 
the monetary authority, 0i  is the steady-state interest rate and 0 0/ (1 )ai    . 
During the crisis period (in the presence of the negative natural rate shock), the monetary 
authority implements the interest rate peg rule at the ZLB level *i , that is: 
*
ti i . (A.17) 
A.5 Aggregation 
Based on Eqs. (A.6), (A.10), (A.15), the zero profit condition of final goods producers 
1
0
( ) ( )t t t tPY P j Y j dj  , and the nominal profits of all intermediate goods firms distributed to the 
household 
1 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tD P j Y j dj W L j dj   , the economy’s resource constraint (i.e., the market 
clearing condition for the final goods) is given by: 
t t tY C G  . (A.18) 
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A.6 Derivation of the IS curve and interest rate rule 
Let the variable with the subscript “0” refer to its steady-state value.  In line with Farhi 
and Werning (2016), we state that 0 0( ) /t tc C C Y  , 0 0( ) /t tg G G Y  , and 0 0( ) /t ty Y Y Y  .  
Then, from the Keynes-Ramsey rule reported in Eq. (A.8) we can infer the following IS curve 
with the linearized deviation form: 
 1 0 0ˆ (1 )a a nt t t t tc i i r        , (A.19) 
where ˆ / (1 )g    , 0 0/g G Y  , and 0a a at t    .   
In a similar way, from Eq. (A.16) we can derive the following interest rate rule: 
0t ti i    . (A.20) 
A.7 Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve 
We then follow Wieland (2019) to derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve in terms of 
the linearized deviation form.  Based on Eq. (A.14), we have:17 
( )t t t        , (A.21) 
where t  represents the real wage rate, 0 0ln( / ) ln( / )t t tW P W P   .  By taking the deviation 
of the variables from their steady-state values in Eq. (A.7) and substituting the result, 
0ˆ (1 )w wt t t tc l         as well as t ty l  into Eq. (A.21), we obtain the NKPC with the 
linearized deviation form: 
w
t t t g t w tc g         , (A.22) 
where ˆ( )( )        , 0w w wt t    , ( )g       and 0( ) (1 )ww       . 
A.7 The linearized deviation form of the economy’s resource constraint 
Then, based on the definitions: 0 0( ) /t tc C C Y  , 0 0( ) /t tg G G Y  , and 0 0( ) /t ty Y Y Y  , 
the economy’s resource constraint in Eq. (A.18) can be expressed as the deviation form: 
t t ty c g  . (A.23) 
Eq. (A.23) is identical to Eq. (3) in the main text. 
 
Appendix B 
Based on Eqs. (12) and (13), we know that * *1 20   .  Then, by using Eqs. (20a), (21a) 
                                               
17
 See Wieland (2019) for a detailed derivation which is reported in the online Appendix E.  The reader should 
be reminded that in deriving the New Keynesian Phillips curve in terms of the linearized deviation form we 
ignore the effect of the productivity shock term. 
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and (22), we can derive the following results for the time interval [0 , ]t T  : 
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, (B2) 
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, (B3) 
where ,t IP , ,t IPc , ,t IPy  denote the inflation rate, consumption and output under the sole ZLB 
policy, respectively.  Eqs. (B1) and (B3) show that, under the sole ZLB policy, the economy 
will sink into a deep recession with deflation. 
Appendix C  
This Appendix provides a detailed derivation of the time paths of t  and tc  during the 
whole transitional periods when the government implements the fiscal expansion policy 
coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy.  Similar to the mathematical derivations in 
association with the sole ZLB interest rate policy in Section 3, by referring to Eqs. (20) and 
(21), the evolution of t  and tc  in association with distinct periods can be expressed as 
follows: 
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. (C2) 
We can infer from Eq. (17) that 1 0 0ˆ( , 0)w ac g     in Eq. (C2) can be expressed as *1 0 0 0 1 1ˆ( , 0) (1 ) /w a a n gc g i r g             . 
Following the same reasoning as in Section 3, four undetermined parameters ( 1A , 2A , *1A , 
and *2A )  in Eqs. (C1) and (C2) can be solved by two continuity conditions, T T    and 
T T
c c  , and two stability conditions, 1 0A   and 2 0A  .  
Inserting *0 0 1ˆ( 0) (1 )a a ni r      ,  *1 0 0 0 1 1ˆ( , 0) (1 ) /w a a n gc g i r g             , 
0 0  , 0 0c  , T T   , T Tc c  , 1 0A  , and 2 0A   into Eqs. (C1) and (C2), we have: 
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According to the resource constraint t t ty c g   reported in Eq. (3), the evolution of ty  
can then be expressed as: 
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. (C5) 
 Equipped with Eqs. (C3), (C4) and (C5), we can infer the following results for the time 
interval [0 , ]t T  : 
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where ,t g , ,t gc , ,t gy  denote the inflation rate, consumption and output under the 
expansionary government spending coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy. By comparing 
(B1) with (C6), (B2) with (C7) and (B3) with (C8), we can obtain: 
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It is clear from Eq. (C11) that the additional fiscal policy in the form of expansionary 
government spending could mitigate the extent of the deep recession. 
Appendix D  
This Appendix provides a detailed derivation of the time paths of t  and tc  during the 
overall transitional periods when the government implements the payroll tax cut policy 
accompanied by the ZLB interest rate policy.  Equipped with Eqs. (20) and (21), the evolution 
of t  and tc  in association with distinct periods can be described as follows: 
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. (D2) 
Based on the resource constraint t t ty c g   together with 0tg  , the evolution of ty  
can then be expressed as: 
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 By using Eqs. (D1), (D2) and (D3), we can derive the following expressions for the time 
interval [0 , ]t T  : 
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where ,t w , ,t wc , ,t wy  denote the inflation rate, consumption and output under the payroll tax 
cut coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy.  Comparing (B1) with (D4), (B2) with (D5) and 
(B3) with (D6) yields: 
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 (D9) 
Eq. (D9) clearly indicates that a payroll tax cut will further exacerbate the deep recession. 
Appendix E  
This appendix provides a detailed derivation of the time paths of t  and tc  under the 
situation where the government implements the financial assets tax cut policy accompanied by 
the ZLB interest rate policy.  By referring to Eqs. (20) and (21), the evolution of t  and tc  
in association with distinct periods can be described as follows: 
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. (E2) 
By using the resource constraint t t ty c g   together with 0tg  , the evolution of ty  
can then be expressed as: 
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. (E3) 
Equipped with Eqs. (E1), (E2) and (E3), we can infer the following results for the time 
interval [0 , ]t T  : 
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where ,t a , ,t ac , ,t ay  denote inflation, consumption and output under the payroll tax cut 
coupled with the ZLB interest rate policy. By comparing (B1) with (E4), (B2) with (E5) and 
(B3) with (E6), we have: 
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. (E9) 
It is quite obvious from Eq. (E9) that a financial assets tax cut tends to further exacerbate the 
deep recession. 
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